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INTRODUCTION

The appointment of Quintan Wiktorowicz, formerly an
academic at Rhodes College, as senior director for global
engagement at the National Security Council offers the perfect
opportunity to open a piece designed to reflect on what lessons the
United Kingdom might be able to offer the United States when it
The reason is simple: Professor
comes to counterterrorism.
Wiktorowicz conducted considerable fieldwork in the United
The
Kingdom where he interviewed hundreds of Islamists.
conclusions he drew based on this research and his experience in
the United Kingdom will apparently be put into practice in his new
job in Washington, D.C.'
The appeal of the United Kingdom to those seeking lessons
about counterterrorism seems obvious. In addition to dealing with
al Qaeda-inspired and organized terrorism, including the 7 July
2005 attacks that left fifty-two people dead across the London
transportation network, since the nineteenth century the United
Kingdom has experienced terrorism related to Ireland, first over

t

University of Birmingham.
1. See generally Dina Ternple-Raston, New Terrorism Adviser Takes a "Broad
Tent" Approach, NPR (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/24/133125267
'
/new-terrorism-adviser-takes-a-broad-tent-approach.
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independence for Ireland and then, once that was achieved,
because of continuing British control of Northern Ireland. The
relevance of Ireland-related terrorism to the issues of today,
however, only goes so far as Peter Clarke, a former top UK
counterterrorism police officer noted in a 2007 speech:
Colleagues from around the world often say to me that
the long experience that we have in the United Kingdom
of combating a terrorist threat must have stood us in good
stead; that the experience gained during some 30 years of
an Irish terrorist campaign would have equipped us for
the new challenges presented by Al-Qaeda and its
associated groups. To an extent that is true-but only to
an extent. The fact is that the Irish campaign actually
operated within a set of parameters that helped shaped
our response to it.
It was essentially a domestic campaign using
conventional weaponry, carried out by terrorists in tightlyknit networks who were desperate to avoid capture and
certainly had no wish to die. The use of warnings
restricted the scale of the carnage, dreadful though it was.
The warnings were cynical and often misleading, but by
restricting casualties, were a factor in enabling the
political process to move forward, however haltingly.
I believe that if you take the reverse of many of these
characteristics, you are not far away from describing the
threat we face today.
There is certainly some validity to Clarke's contention,
although the purpose of this piece is not to get into a comparison
of old versus new terrorism. The point to be remembered is that
while the terrorism threats differ, the counterterrorism methods to
be employed in response do not deviate as widely.
Even more significant to examining the lessons from the
United Kingdom is the nature of the threats since the attacks of 11
September 2001. The fear at the time was that this was to be one of
a series of high profile spectaculars. Thus, 9/11 became the initial
model for the future of post-9/11 terrorism. However, in many
2. Peter Clarke, Head of the Metro. Police Counter Terrorism Command,
Learning From Experience: Counter Terrorism in the UK since 9/11 (April 27,
available at http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications
2007),
/pdfs/Learning-fromExperience-4Jun_07.pdf.
3. For more on the alleged differences, see PETER R. NEUMANN, OLD AND
NEW TERRORISM (2009).
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respects, 9/11 was a unique, never-to-be-repeated occurrence. The
element of surprise has been lost. The vulnerability of American
airline security and the U.S. immigration system to terrorists, while
not completely removed, has been greatly reduced. And greater
resources have flowed into counterterrorism, rendering the
possibility of a 9/11-style attack far less likely because such an
enterprise needs coordination and involvement of a substantial
number of individuals, many from abroad. That means the
spectacular is far less likely than the small-scale, homegrown
terrorist atrocity of the type that occurred in London in July 2005.
This is low-intensity doable terrorism requiring only a small
number of persons, or even a single individual, making such
undertakings difficult to detect and prevent. Equally, however, the
loss of life, while horrible, is on a scale far below 9/11.
In such a terrorism climate, responding to small-scale,
homegrown plots takes on greater significance, hence the
relevance of the UK example to U.S. counterterrorism. The
parallel threats are already evident.
The example of Faisal
Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, mirrors the June 2007
failed attacks in London, when a similar car bomb to that of
Shahzad's did not detonate outside of a London nightclub. The
7/7 attacks also have their parallel in the plot under the leadership
of Najibullah Zazi, an Afghani-American citizen, to carry out
coordinated suicide bomb attacks on the New York City subway.
There is not just anecdotal evidence of a growing threat in the
United States from homegrown, al Qaeda-inspired, supported, and,
organized attacks involving individuals, small groups, or cellsthere is quantifiable evidence as well. Arrests in twenty-two
separate al Qaeda-inspired homegrown plots were made in the
United States between May 2009 and November 2010. This
compares

to

arrests

in

twenty-one

separate Islamist-inspired

homegrown plots between 11 September 2001 and May 2009."
4. See CarBomb Defused Outside London Nightclub, THE INDEPENDENT, June 29,
2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/car-bomb-defused-outsidelondon-nightclub-455220.html; Times Square Bomber FaisalShahzad Gets Life Sentence,
THE TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 5, 2010, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com
/2010-10-05/us/28271385 1_muslim-solider-terrorism-and-weapons-counts-dronestrikes.
5. See A.G. Sulzberger & William K. Rashbaum, Guilty Plea Made in Plot to
Bomb New York Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/02/23/nyregion/23terror.html?.
6. JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARKA. RANDOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMERICAN
JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING
A COMPLEX
THREAT Summary
(2010),
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With this background in mind, the following are three general
lessons to be learned from the post-9/11 counterterrorism
experience in the United Kingdom.
II. LESSON ONE: ADDITIONAL LAWS CAN BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
A traditional response to serious acts of terrorism in the
United Kingdom, both before and after 9/11, has been to enact
new laws.' In some cases, the laws were designed to address
perceived gaps available to be exploited by terrorists. For instance,
after 9/11, Prime Minister Tony Blair's government passed
legislation, as did other countries, to target the financing of
terrorism. Similarly, after the 7/7 suicide bombings, the Blair
government made it a criminal offence to attend terrorism-training
camps." But the Blair government also repeatedly overstepped the
legal and law enforcement bounds. A number of laws were passed,
including one criminalizing the glorification of terrorism and
another making the possession of terrorism materials illegal. Both
potentially infringed on free-speech rights and, in one case, a
graduate student was arrested and held for six days before being
released without charge after he downloaded an al Qaeda training
manual off of the U.S. State Department's website. 9 The British
government also empowered the police, using the justification of
the threat from terrorism, to stop and search hundreds of
thousands of people. It introduced an identity card, initially to be
mandatory but later made voluntary, by making the case that this
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf.

For

more

on

domestic

developments in the United States since 9/11, see BRIAN MICHAELJENKINS, WOULDBE WARRIORS: INCIDENTS OF JIHADIST TERRORIST RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED

STATES

SINCE

SEPTEMBER

11,

2001

(2010),

http://www.rand.org

/pubs/occasionalpapers/2010/RANDOP292.uspdf. Jenkins is careful to point
out that the level of terrorist violence and the loss of life was actually higher in the
1970s than it has been in the United States since 9/11. See id. at viii. See also Rick
"Ozzie" Nelson & Ben Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing "Homegrown"
Extremism in the United States, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
(Mar. 2010), http://csis.org/files/publication/100304_NelsonGrowingTerrorist
ThreatWeb.pdf.
7. For a longer account of this history, see LAURA K. DONOHUE, COUNTERTERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1922-2000
(2007).
8. STEVE HEWITr, THE BRITISH WAR ON TERROR: TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM ON THE HOME FRONT SINCE 9-11 (2008).
9. See Polly Curtis & Martin Hodgson, Student Researchingal-Qaida Tactics Held
24, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk
May
for Six Days, GUARDIAN,
/education/2008/may/24/highereducation.uk.
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was a required counterterrorism tool.
This argument was
undermined by the 2004 Madrid train bombings carried out in a
country with identity cards and by the London bombings in which
identity cards would not have made a difference.
The
counterterrorism justification for identity cards was eventually
dropped and the whole exercise was scaled back before being
cancelled by the coalition government that came to power in
2010.10 Similarly, after 7/7, the Blair government proposed
extending the period that terrorism suspects could be held after
arrest but before being charged with an offence from fourteen days
to ninety days. The government's argument that the complexity of
international-terrorism cases meant more time was needed to
collect evidence was not accepted by UK parliamentarians, who
allowed only an increase to twenty-eight days. In 2008, the
government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown raised the issue
again with a proposal to increase the period of detention without
charge to forty-two days. This proposal too was blocked with even a
past director of Britain's domestic intelligence agency, the Security
Service (M15), speaking out against it."
When it came to the exercise of state powers, the problem was
the collective message that these measures sent to those most
vulnerable. Statistically, citizens of ethnic and religious minority
communities in the United Kingdom have been disproportionately
targeted under terrorism stop-and-search measures. The repeated
efforts to push for longer periods of detention before facing a
charge similarly sent a negative message to these same
communities, especially when fifty-five percent of all of those
arrested under terrorism legislation between 9/11 and 31 March
2010 were released without charge." The UK government should
10. See A Question of Identity, BBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2001, 10:30 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1562427.stm; FinalStop for ID Cards as Trial Bites
the
Dust,
MANCHESTER
EVENING
NEWS
(Jan.
22,
2011),
http://menmedia.co.uk/manchestereveningnews/news/s/1406030_final_stop
foridcards-as_trialbites_thedust.
11. See Ian Drury, Former Head of MJ5 Declares 42-Day Detention Plans are
"Unworkable", DAILY MAIL, July 9, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1033377/Former-head-MI5-declares-42-day-detention-plans-unworkable.html;
see
also Blair Defeated over Terror Laws, BBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2005, 11:12 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk-politics/4422086.stm.
12. See HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL BULLETIN, OPERATION OF POLICE POWERS
UNDER THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 AND SUBSEQUENT
LEGISLATION: ARRESTS, OUTCOMES AND STOPS & SEARCHES 15, 41 (2010),

http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-
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already have known the dangers in such an approach. Internment
without trial was introduced in Northern Ireland in the 1970s with
disastrous results from a counterterrorism perspective. It served as
a recruiting tool for the Irish Republican Army." The dangers of
an overreaction in the current climate are great, as terrorism
expert Brian Jenkins notes: "[One danger of this response is that
revelations of abuse or of heavy-handed tactics could easily
discredit intelligence operations, provoke public anger, and erode
the most effective barrier of all to radicalization: the cooperation of

the community."

4

III. LESSON TWO: FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS
Another important message from the United Kingdom for the
United States is that the terrorism problem is "glocal" in nature.
In an interview with a senior counterterrorism officer in 2010, I
He
referred to the 7 July 2005 terrorists as "homegrown."1
immediately took issue with this label, arguing that it downplayed
the interconnection between the foreign and domestic, and the
means through modern technology that citizens of one country can
live virtual lives in other countries.1 Thus, something occurring
thousands of miles away and not directly connected to the local
environment, such as in the case of the United Kingdom, India's
18
occupation of Muslim Kashmir, can motivate terrorism.
The same point applies even more forcefully when what is
occurring thousands of miles away is being carried out by your
country. Long after the bombs exploded on 7 July 2005, the Blair

statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/hosbl810/hosbl810; see also Robert Verkaik,
Muslims Hit by Trebling in Stop and Search, INDEPENDENT, May 1, 2009,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/muslims-hit-by-trebling-in-stopand-search-1677107.html.
13. See Patrick Mercer, I Saw What Internment Did in Ulster. . That's Why I Know
a 42-Day Law will Actually Help Terrorists, DAILY MAIL, June 7, 2008,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1024933/Patrick-Mercer-I-sawinternment-did-Ulster-thats-I-know-42-day-law-actually-help-terrorists.html.
14. JENKINS, supranote 6, at viii.
15. For more on "glocalisation," the concept of thinking globally but acting
locally, see Barry Wellman & Keith Hampton, Living Networked in a Wired World, 28
CONTEMP. Soc. 648-54 (1999).
16. Interview with senior counterterrorism officer, (June 17, 2010) (on file
with author).
17. Id.
18. MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESSJIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 85 (2008).
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government, including the Prime Minister himself, publicly denied
any linkage between UK foreign policy, specifically related to
Muslim countries, and al Qaeda-inspired terrorism at home.
Behind the scenes it was a different story. In 2004, two important
UK government departments, the Home Office and the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, commissioned a joint report entitled,
Young Muslims and Extremism. 20 The report, which was leaked to the
British media after the 7/7 attacks, left no doubt about the strong
relationship between what the United Kingdom did abroad and
discontent at home:
- It seems that a particularly strong cause of disillusionment
amongst Muslims including young Muslims is a perceived
"double standard" in the foreign policy of western
governments (and often those of Muslim governments), in
particular Britain and the US.
This is particularly
significant in terms of the concept of the "Ummah," i.e.
that Believers are one "nation." This seems to have gained
a significant prominence in how some Muslims view
HMG's policies towards Muslim countries.
- Perceived Western bias in Israel's favour over the
Israel/Palestinian conflict is a key long term grievance of
the international Muslim community which probably
influences British Muslims.
- This perception seems to have become more acute post
9/11. The perception is that passive "oppression," as
demonstrated in British foreign policy, eg non-action on
Kashmir and Chechnya, has given way to "active
oppression"-the war on terror, and in Iraq and
Afghanistan are all seen by a section of British Muslims as
having been acts against Islam.
- This disillusionment may contribute to a sense of
helplessness with regard to the situation of Muslims in the
world, with a lack of any tangible "pressure valves," in
order to vent frustrations, anger or dissent.
The British government had already received a warning of the
19. Tariq Ramadan, Blair can No Longer Deny a Link Exists between Terrorism and
ForeignPolicy, GUARDIAN, June 4, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree
/2007/jun/04/comment.politics.
20. UK FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE/HOME OFFICE, DRAFr REPORT ON
YOUNG
MUSLIMS
AND
EXTREMISM
(2004),
http://www.globalsecurity.org
/security/library/report/2004/muslimext-uk.htm.
21. Id.
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linkage just prior to the invasion of Iraq. The Joint Intelligence
Committee, which brings together the United Kingdom's three
main intelligence agencies, warned the government that invading
Iraq would increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks within the
United Kingdom. 2 Even senior UK politicians would later accept
the connection between British foreign policy and domestic
23
terrorism.
In that sense, a self-delusion gripped the United States in the
immediate aftermath of 7/7 as media coverage contrasted the
situation of Muslim communities in the United Kingdom with
those in the United States, with the latter being more middle class
and being better integrated.24 However, as cases such as Shahzad
and Zazi demonstrate, American exceptionalism provides no
People have multiple
special immunity from global forces.
identities and loyalties (a factor again heightened by technology),
greater economic integration through globalization, and mass
immigration. One example of the impact of these forces is that
since the end of the Cold War, a growing factor in cases of
espionage against the United States has been individuals with dual
citizenship.W Having a strong national identity and an ideology
built around notions of exceptionalism offers no special immunity
to international currents. The involvement of Somali Americans in
terrorism in Africa and allegedly in plots in the United States
already demonstrates this.2 Nor is any of this unique to the
present. In the 1930s, thousands of young men from across
22. Richard Norton-Taylor & Michael White, Report Reveals Blair Overruled
Terror Warning, GuARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics
/2003/sep/12/uk.davidkelly3.
23. See Hilary Benn, Sec'y of State for Int'l Dev., N.Y., Where Does
Development Fit in Foreign Policy? (Apr. 16, 2007),
available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/MediaRoom/Speeches-and-articles/2007-to-do/Where-does-Development-fit-in-ForeignPolicy/; Tony Blair, Fmr. British Prime Minister, Resignation Speech (May 10,
2007), availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukpolitics/6642857.stm.
24. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, In American Cities, No Mirror Image of Muslims of
Leeds, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/21
/nyregion/21immigration.html.
25. KATHERINE L. HERBIG, DEP'T OF DEF., TECHNICAL REPORT 08-05, CHANGES IN
ESPIONAGE BY AMERICANS:
1947-2007 viii (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp
/library/changes.pdf.
26. FBI Chief: Suicide Bomber Indoctrinated in Minnesota, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis,
Minn.),
Feb.
24,
2009,
http://www.startribune.com
/local/minneapolis/40202352.html; AG: Ore. Plot CouldHave Been "Tragically Real,"
CBS NEWS, (Nov. 29, 2010),

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/29/national/main7099783.shtml.
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Western nations, including from the United Kingdom and the
United States, left their homes and their families and, against the
wishes of their governments, travelled to a foreign country to take
up arms and fight and, in some cases, die." The cause that
motivated them was the Spanish Civil War and a belief in workingclass solidarity with their Spanish brethren in the face of fascist
aggression." And centuries earlier, of course, Crusaders from
across Europe travelled to the Middle East to try to free Christian
sites from Muslim occupation.
In a real sense then, none of this is new. Nor is it being
suggested that foreign policies should necessarily be changed
because of the interconnection of the foreign and the domestic.
However, both the British and American governments have
realized that greater consideration must be given to the impact of
foreign policies, perceptions of foreign policies, and the selling of
foreign policies to skeptical audiences, both at home and abroad.
IV. LESSON THREE: COOPERATION IS BETTER THAN CONDEMNATION
In the lead up to his replacing Tony Blair, Gordon Brown

repeatedly emphasized in interviews the need to win hearts and
minds as part of efforts against terroism. His terminology when
applied domestically was, however, problematic in two ways: it is a
counter insurgency phrase and it assumes a lack of loyalty or even
outright hostility on the part of communities within the United
Kingdom. Such an approach runs the risk of creating a suspect
community similar to the way that the Irish community was
stigmatized during The Troubles.

Equally misguided is blaming terrorism on Islam, as the British
example demonstrates. Considerable evidence exists, including in
the work of Quintan Wiktorowicz, Marc Sageman, and in a detailed
study by M15, that strong Islamic beliefs can serve as a barrier to
involvement in terrorism.

In other words, terrorists may have a

27. HUGH THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 553, 942-43 (Penguin Books
2003) (1961).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Gordon Brown, British Prime Minister, Interview with Andrew
Marr (Jan. 7, 2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk~politics
/6241819.stm; Elizabeth Dickinson, A Bright Shining Slogan, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Sept./Oct.
2009,
at
29,
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com
/articles/2009/08/13/abright shining-slogan;
PADDY
HILLYARD,
SUSPECT
COMMUNrlY: PEOPLE'S EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACTS IN

BRITAIN (1993).
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skewed view of Islam or even no religious beliefs at all-not
necessarily an orthodox faith.3o Equally problematic is associating
terrorism with a lack of integration on the part of the same Islamic
communities. A 2006 detailed study of the background of seventyfive Muslims charged in the United Kingdom with terrorism
offences found that they were less likely to come from
predominantly Muslim areas as opposed to more ethnically mixed
areas. This certainly reflects the example of the 7/7 bombers who,
by all accounts, were relatively well integrated. Indeed, one of the
bombers, Jermaine Lindsay, was a convert to Islam as was Nicky
Reilly, a failed bomber in Exeter in 2008.
This means any path to the future must be one of partnership
between the police, intelligence agencies, and Muslim communities
in which notions of the latter as suspect communities are dropped.
At times, this may mean engaging with groups and individuals who
hold beliefs outside of the mainstream, creating the risk of media
and political controversy. It also means downplaying hard policing
methods, such as the aggressive recruitment of informers, which
have already damaged police-Muslim relations in both the United
31
In turn, an embracing of a
Kingdom and the United States.
holistic approach to counterterrorism in which wider community
issues, such as racism and hate crimes are addressed, will foster a
sense of cooperation. Already, efforts are being made by police
forces in the United Kingdom to work on partnerships. The
London Metropolitan Police established a Muslim Contact Unit in
2002 in an attempt to reach out to traditionally marginalized

30. Temple-Raston, supra note 1; SAGEMAN, supra note 18, at 37-40; Alan
Travis, M15 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain, GUARDIAN, Aug. 20, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1.

31. Vikram Dodd, Study Rejects Claim that Muslim Areas Harbour Terrorists,
Nov. 20, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/nov/20
GUARDIAN,
/terrorism.politics; Adam Fresco, Nicky Reilly, Muslim Convert, Jailedfor 18 Years for
Exeter Bomb Attack, TIMES (London), Jan. 31, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk
/tol/news/uk/crime/article5619151.ece.
32. Andrea Elliott, Undercover Work Deepens Police-Muslim Tensions, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/27/nyregion/27muslim.html;
BASIA SPALEK ET AL., POLICE-MUSLIM ENGAGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE
PURPOSES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: AN EXAMINATION 12, 33 (2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/26514450/Police-Muslim- Enld; DAVID SCHANZER ET
AL., ANTI-TERROR LESSONS OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS 3, 28, 42-43 (2010), available at
http://www.sanford.duke.edu/news/SchanzerKurzmanMoosaAntiTerrorLessons.pdf; STEVE HEWrrr, SNITCH: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMER 121-46 (2010).
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groups." Fostering such relationships can lead to greater efforts on
the part of targeted communities themselves to supply information
to the authorities but also to police themselves. However, such
relationships remain fragile and controversial.
V.

CONCLUSION

Having written about three important lessons for American
counterterrorism from the UK experience, it is still not clear that
these same lessons have been learned in the United Kingdom, at
least on the part of politicians. In early February 2011, Prime
Minister David Cameron gave a speech at a security conference in
which he suggested that UK terrorism had been caused by a lack of
integration, which, in turn, had been fostered by multiculturalism.
He also downplayed British foreign policy as a root cause of
terrorism and said his, government would no longer have any
involvement with Islamic groups that it considers to be extremist,
A similar path is being
even if the extremism is nonviolent.:
embraced in other European countries, usually by parties on the
right, and sometimes on the extreme right of the political
spectrum. 5 Congressman Peter King appears ready to claim the
American franchise for this type of politics as he chaired, to the
condemnation of many, hearings into the radicalization of
American Muslims.
Such efforts, while undoubtedly appealing to many in the
public and in the media and potentially even rewarding at the
ballot box, are fundamentally counterproductive in terms of
They risk alienating Muslim citizens whose
counterterrorism.
33. Robert Lambert, Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised Minority
Faith Communities Counteringal-Qaida,50 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 73 (2008).
34. David Cameron, British Prime Minister, Speech at the Munich Security
Conference (Feb. 5, 2011), available at http://www.numberl0.gov.uk/news
/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference60293.
35. Christopher Dickey, Turn on the Red Light: Muslim-Bashing PoliticiansMay
Get Votes, but They're Raising the Threat to Europe, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/10/04/how-muslim-bashers-raise-europe-sterroism-risk.html.
36. Jeff Stein, Rep. Peter King's Plan for Hearings on Muslim "Radicalization"
2011,
21,
POsT, Jan.
All
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assistance is needed to track terrorism recruitment in their
communities. Even worse, such an approach, which in some places
borders on demonization of Muslims and has fuelled
Islamophobia," directly reinforces al Qaeda's meta narrative in
which Islam is under siege by the West and Muslims themselves
have no place in Western countries.8 A politicized approach to
counterterrorism, which flies in the face of the lessons learned
since 9/11, ultimately serves no one except al Qaeda.
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See Dickey, supra note 35.
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